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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

UTAH PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'
ASSOCIATION and LARRY
FIELDS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

-vCASE NO. 16616

STATE OF UTAH and SCOTT
M. MATHESON, Governor
of the State of Utah,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS'

NATURE OF CASE
Appellants filed an action in the Third Judicial District
Court, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief that a policy directive
issued by the Governor of the State of Utah, prohibiting employees in
the Division of Wildlife Resources from participating in an annual drawing for once-in-a-life-time hunting permits, violated the employees' rights.
The Third Judicial District Court granted respondents' Motion for Summary
Judgment on all issues.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affinnation of the decision of the Third
Judicial District Court, declaring the Governor's policy directive
to be lawful and constitutional.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents generally accept appellants' Statement of Facts,
except respondents disagree that there are at least three less burdensome alternative approaches, or that that aspect is even relevant to the
present issues.
Appellants fail to mention that

in 1978, just prior to the

Governor's policy directive being issued, three Division of Wildlife Resources' employees who,submitted applications, were successful in obtaining permits for the hunt.

One employee obtained two pennits--one for the

Big Horn sheep and one for the buffalo.

Another employee received only

a moose permit, and a third employee received only a Big Horn sheep permit.

That year, 3,181 applications (320 Big Horn sheep, 1261 buffalo, 1600

moose) were received for the drawings.

Out of the 3,181 applications, only

20 sheep permits, 20 buffalo pennits, and 90 moose pennits would be issued,
of which one employee obtained two permits; another employee received a
moose permit, and a third employee received a Big Horn sheep permit.
Appellants also fail to mention that, subsequent to the Third
Judicial District Court's ruling in this matter, the attorneys for both parties met in chambers with the Honorable HomerF. Wilkinson, District Judge,
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regarding the Memorandum Decision issued by Judge Wilkinson on
July 18, 1979.

The sum and substance of that conversation was

that Judge Wilkinson ruled definitively for defendants-respondents
in the matter, and plaintiffs' only remedy at that point, according
to the Judge, was to seek an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.
ARGUMENT
POINT
THE GOVERNOR HAS STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE POLICY DIRECTIVE IN QUESTION.
The Governor is statutorily and constitutionally authorized to
adopt the policy in question.

(See Exhibit A. attached hereto.)

Utah

Code Ann. Section 67-1-1 (1953), provides, in part:
"In addition to those prescribed by the Constitution, the governor has the following powers and must
perform the following duties:
(1)

He shall supervise the official conduct of all
executive and ministerial officers."

The mandatory language of the above-cited statute requires the Governor
to supervise the conduct of all State employees.

The manner in which

the drawing for the big hunt permits is carried out is within the scope
of "official conduct" of employees and_ is properly within the supervisory
powers of the Governor over

ministeria~icers.

The Utah Constitution, Article VII, Section 5, prescribes the
duties of the Governor and provides, in part:
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"The Governor shall see that the laws are faithfully executed; he shall transact all executive business with the officers of the government, civil and
military, and may require information in writing from
the officers of the Executive Department,
"
The above-cited constitutional provision, requiring the Governor to
see that the laws are faithfully executed, contains the inherent constitutional authority to issue policy directives regarding the affairs
of State government.

(See, generally, 38 Am. Jur. 2d, Governor, Sections

l and 4, at pages 932-935.)

In the case of Kenny v. Byrne, 365 A.2d 211,

144 N.J. Super. 243 (1976), the New Jersey Superior Court upheld an Executive Order of the Governor of New Jersey, requiring high echelon State employees to file financial disclosure

state~ents.

The Court in so holding

stated:
"Appellants' brief raises the question of the
authority of the Governor to issue the executive
order, contending that it is ultra vires and beyond
his constitutional powers. This contention is manifestly without merit.
"The Governor is vested with the executive power of
the State. N.J. Const. ( 1947), Art. V, Section 1, par.
1. As the head of the Executive Branch of government
he has the duty and power to supervise all employees in
each principal department of that branch. Ji., Art. V,
Section 4, par. 2. Of necessity, this includes the inherent power to issue directives and orders by way of
implementation in order to insure efficient and honest
performance by those state employees within his jurisdiction. Such power stems from the Governor's responsibility
under the foregoing constitutional provisions as well as
Art. V, Section l, par. 11, which requires that he 'take
care that the laws be faithfully executed."' 355 A.2d 211,
215.

-4-
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There can be no question that the Governor has the legal authority
to adopt said policy directive under both the statutes of the State
and the Utah Constitution.

See, generally, Note, Gubernatorial Ex-

ecutive Orders as Devices for Administrative Direction and Control,
50 Iowa Law Review 78 (1964).
The Utah Legislature has adopted the Utah Public Officers'
and Employees' Ethics Act, set forth in Utah Code Ann. Section 67-16-1 (1953),
~..

Said Act has application to these appellants who are the em-

ployees of the Division of Wildlife Resources, Department of Natural
Resources, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 67-16-3 (9) (1953), defining a "public employee."

Utah Code Ann. Section 67-16-4 (3), pro-

vi des:
No public officer or public employee shall:
(3)

Use or attempt to use his official
position to secure special privileges
or exemptions for himself or others."

The Governor, being fearful of the appearance of impropriety if State employees participated in a drawing for the 20-to-90 permits to hunt big game
animals, adopted a policy

prohibiting Division employees and members of

the Big Game Board from participating in the drawing.

Said policy was

adopted in the discretion of the Governor to further the best interests of the
people of the State of Utah and to carry

~,the

legislative mandate which

would prohibit "actual or potential conflicts of interest."

The Legislature

-5-
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set forth in Utah Code Ann. Section 67-16-2 (1953):
"Purpose of act.--The purpose of this act is to set
forth standards of conduct for officers and employees
of the state of Utah and its political subdivisions in
areas where there are actual or potential conflicts of
interest between their public duties and their private
interest. In this manner the legislature intends to
promote the public interest and strengthen the faith and
confidence of the people of Utah in the integrity of
their government. It does not intend to deny any pub1ic officer or employee the opportunity available to all
other citizens of the state to acquire private economic
or other interests so long as this does not interfere with
his full and faithful discharge of his public duties."
(Emphasis added.)
In the above-cited Kenny v. Byrne, supra, the Court noted in dictum:
" ... By accepting public employment an individual
steps from the category of a purely private citizen to
that of a public citizen. And in that transition he must
of necessity subordinate his private rights to the extent
that they may compete or conflict with the superior right
of the public to achieve honest and efficient government."
635 A.2d 211, 216.
The Governor's policy, prohibiting Wildlife employees from participating
in the big game drawing, was adopted to insure the greatest degree of pub·
lie confidence in honest and efficient government and to avoid any appearance of impropriety.

To rule in appellants' favor that the Governor may

not adopt such a policy would severely weaken the Governor's office and
thwart his efforts to achieve the highest degree of integrity in government as well as to instill public confidence in honest, efficient, and fair
government.

-6-
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POINT II
THE GOVERNOR'S POLICY DIRECTIVE DOES NOT VIOLATE
APPELLANTS' CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS AS
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES.
The policy adopted by the Governor does not infringe upon
any legally protected rights of appellants' or employees' of the Division of Wildlife Resources.

The above-cited Kenny v. Byrne, supra,

sets forth the general test regarding constitutional infringement of
rights.

The New Jersey Superior Court in finding no constitutional im-

pairments under the facts of that case, stated:
"It is axiomatic that a classification in a statute
or executive order does not offend the Equal Protection
Clause if it conceivably has some reasonable basis to
justify the same. Mere inequality or difference in treatment does not suffice to support a charge of unconstitutional
discrimination. See Dandridge v. Williams, 3g7 U.S. 471,
90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970}; Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369
(1910). And a classification must be upheld under any reasonable set of facts unless there is a showing of invidious discrimination. Morey v. Dowd, 354 U.S. 457, 463, 77 S.Ct.
1344, 1348, l L.Ed.2d 1485, 1490 (1957).

"A classification is presumed to be constitutional and
the one who attacks it has the burden of showing that it
is arbitrary and without a reasonable basis to support it.
David v. Vesta Co., 45 N.J. 301, 315, 212 A.2d 345 (1965).
Plaintiffs have utterly failed to sustain this burden."
365 A.2d 211, 219.
Respondents particularly cite the leading case of Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., supra, which basically sets forth the "reasonable basis"
test.

The Court in that case held that:

- 7-
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"The rules by which this contention must be
tested, as is shown by repeated decisions of this
court, are these:
1.

The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not take from the state the power
to classify in the adoption of police laws, but
admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard and avoids what is done only
when it is without any reasonable basis and,
therefore, is purely arbitrary.

2.

The classification having some reasonable basis
does not offend against the clause merely because
it is not made with mathematical nicety or because
in practice it results in some inequity.

3.

When a classification in such a law is called in
question, if any state of facts reasonably can be
conceived that would sustain it, the existence of
that state of facts at the time the law was enacted
must be assumed.

4.

One who assails the classification in such a law
must carry the burden of showing that it does not
rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially
arbitrary." 220 U.S. 61, 78-79.

The Utah cases, setting forth the "reasonable basis for classification"
test are legion, and respondents would refer this Court to only a few of
those cases:

Slater v. Salt Lake City, et al., 115 Utah 476, 206 P.2d 153

(1949); State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d 920, 117 A.L.R. 330 (1938).
As contrasted with the "reasonable basis for classification" test
is the so-called "strict scrutiny" test whenever a "fundamental interest"
is involved or a "suspect" classification may exist.

In those circumstances.

the Court has concluded that any statutory classifications must be justified
by showing a "compelling State interest" necessitating the classification,
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and that the distinctions are necessary to further the purpose of
the statute or regulation.

The "strict scrutiny" cases, however,

seem to be confined to the violation of fundamentally guaranteed
rights.

These cases traditionally deal with questions of race dis-

tinctions, right-to-vote, right of interstate travel and movement,
right to constitutional protections in criminal processes, right of
procreation, and other fundamentally guaranteed rights.

The cases

cited by appellants' seem to rely upon one facet of a "strict scrutiny"
11

test, requiring that"no other less restrictive alternatives be found
available.

Appellants extrapolate from this portion of the strict

scrutiny test and suggest that the Governor must mandatorily exhaust
all other available and possibly less restrictive alternatives before
he may take any action regarding the conduct of Executive Branch employees.
Respondents submit that the "strict scrutiny" test should not
be applied, because no fundamentally guaranteed rights or interests are
at stake.

It is very difficult to precisely define "fundamental rights"--

yet those terms have conceptual meaning to most everyone hearing them.
Respondents believe that the best definition, aside from listing a multitude of specific examples from earlier decisions, is found in 16 Am.Jur.2d,
Constitutional Law, at page 635, defining a "constitution":
A constitution is not the beginning of a community, nor does it originate and create institutions of
government. Instead, it assumes the existence of an
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established system which is still to continue in
force, and it is based on pre-existing rights,
laws, and modes of thought. It has been aptly
said that written constitutions sanctify and confirm great principles, but do not bring them into
existence, and that a constitution is not the cause,
but a consequence, of personal and political freedom."
This implies that "fundamental rights" are those "pre-existing rights"
which our constitutions and laws protect.

These are the "certain un-

alienable Rights" referred to by Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of
Independence.

The "rights" sought to be protected by appellants' to seek

a hunting permit or "not to be excluded" by virtue of accepting public employment, under the facts of this case, do not rise to the level of fundamental rights.

They are at best pennissive rights obtainable only under

the State's licensing or franchising power.

Hence, the "strict scrutiny"

test should have no application.
The cases cited by appellants' all deal with limitations on the
political activities of public employees and, as such, are not in point.
The "strict scrutiny" test is generally regarded as an exception to the
traditional equal protection standards of requiring that a rational basis
exist for statutory classifications, in order that the objects or purposes
of the legislation may be obtained.

Neither this Court nor any other court

in similar situations has required that the governor of a state in issuing
a policy directive regarding the conduct of public employees make an extensive search for less restrictive alternatives, in order to control the administrative affairs of State government.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The~

case (421 P.2d 409 (1966)) is one of three

cases from the State of California cited by appellants'.

Those

cases may be unique to the State of California, but, in any event,
they all deal with the deprivation of political and First Amendment
rights.

This Court expressly rejected the application of

the~

case in Salt Lake City Firefighters' Local 1645 v. Salt Lake City,
22 Utah 2d 115, 449 P.2d 239 (1979).

In the Firefighters' case, the

Court unanimously held that Salt Lake City had the power to require employees of the Fire Department to be residents of the city.

Re-

spondents submit that seeking less restrictive alternatives is not
the current law in the

State of Utah and simply has no application

to this fact situation.
An examination of the class of employees affected by the policy
of the Governor reflects a sound and reasonable basis for the Governor's
decision.

The affected employees are all those who may have direct con-

tact with those individuals conducting the drawing as well as employees
having access to inside information regarding the whereabouts of the big
game, the habits and movements of the animals, and access to special
radio-sensing devices, which would aid in killing one of the big game
animals.

Said employees in appellants' class also are charged with the

responsibi1ity of wildlife management and conservation within the State of
Utah.

They personally participate in the decision-making processes regard-

ing wildlife and are most likely to become involved in conflicts of interests,
or other improper activities regarding the selection of 20-to-90 resident

- 11-
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permits for shooting the big game animals.
In response to public criticism when 3,181 applications
were received in 1978, of which only 20 sheep permits, 20 buffalo
permits and 90 moose permits would be issued, with three employees
re~eiving

four permits, the Governor in his discretion decided that

the public interest would best be served if all employees in Wildlife
Resources were excluded from participation in the drawing.

While no

evidence exists that there was any impropriety on the part of the Division of Wildlife Resources' employees, the Governor issued the directive
to "clear up any misunderstanding that may arise about the propriety of
Wildlife personnel participating in a drawing of this kind."
Respondents submit that, in order to insure a strong, efficient,
and honest government and create the greatest amount of public confidence
in our government officials, appellants should be prohibited from participating in the drawing.
CONCLUSION
Respondent, Scott M. Matheson, Governor of the State of Utah,
has statutory and constitutional authority to supervise the employees in
the Executive Branch of government and to issue policy directives.

Said

policy statement in question is legally and lawfully adopted and has a sound,
rational basis--that being to create public confidence in the honesty and
integrity of State government.

Said policy does not infringe upon any
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constitutional or legally protected right of appellants' and does
not discriminate under the Constitution.

The District Court's de-

cision should be affirmed.
DATED this 30th day o October, 1979.

General
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13-

EXHIBIT (A)

STXTL OF UTAII
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
SALT LAKE CITY
84114

NE\,JS

November 7, 1978

GOVER'.lOR SETS HUNTING POLICY
FOR WILDLIFE RESOURCES PERSOc·ll-iEL

Governor Scott M. Matheson today issued a policy which
prohibits personnel from the Division of Wildlife. Resources, the
mcm.!:iers of the Wildlife Resources Board and the Director of the
Department of Natural Resources from participating in special
com9uter draws for once-in-a-lifetime hunt permits.
The special hunts that arc involved include the buffalo
for which 20 resident permits were awarded this year, the
piu-horn sheep hunt, for which 20 resident permits were offered
~his

year, and the moose hunt, for which 90 resident permits were

tvJilable this year.

In addition, there were two non-resident

De::r.iit.s available for the buffalo hunt, three non-resident permits

lor the big-horn sheep hunt and 10 non-resident permits for the
tuoSe hunt.

These non-resident permits cost $1,000 each.

'1'!10.se huntcrs 1>"ho dra1-1 a permit for a parliculcir hunt arc
.l1c11 .LJ1c.L L<J 1ulc for iul:ucc Jcc11vi.!l'JS foe l:l1c.tl liu11L, licncc the tcT.l!l
u·1,ce:-.i.J1-L1-lifcL.ir·1c" hunls.
The C0vc111or said

that lie issued the directive "to clear:
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: 0 ·.-cmbcr 7, l.978
page Two

"Past dra11ings have been by computer and have been

toc:ally legitimate and proper," Governor Matheson said.

new

"This

policy will simply clarify who is eligible and who is ineligible

for the dn:iv1ings."

Contact:
Margaret L. Wilde
533-4552

\

\
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